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INSIDE INFORMATION: DEFINITIONS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
THE U.K., AND THE U.S.
Stephen HERNE *
The problem of insider trading has been dealt with in various ways by Australia. Canada. the
United Kingdom, and the United States. This article compares the statutory regulation and case last,
regarding insider trading in these countries, as well as formulating a framework for analysis of the
existing law.
1. Introduction
Insider trading usually involves the sale or purchase of company shares or
securities by persons connected with a company (insiders), who have price-sen-
sitive information not generally known by the public or by the persons with
whom the insiders deal. It is an activity many jurisdictions have sought to
proscribe [1].
For a variety of reasons, definitions of inside information in Australia,
Canada and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have undergone considerable change
during a short period of time. In Australia, case law has refined earlier ideas.
The U.K. reconsidered the policy basis for legislation concerning inside
information. This has narrowed the field of prohibition. In Canada, changes
have been initiated mainly in Ontario and Quebec.
This article will consider the scope of the statutory definitions of inside
information in these three jurisdictions and the relevant United States (U.S.)
case law. Section 2 will set out the relevant statutory references to inside
information in Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. Section 3 will
explore the relevant definitions of inside information. Consideration of differ-
ent definitions of insider trading can aid statutory interpretation as well as
serve to illustrate different perceptions of the "evil" that this type of legisla-
tion is designed to attack.
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2. Statutory Scheme in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.
2.1. Common Law Background
In Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, and the U.K.,
Percival v. Wright [2] stands for the proposition that insider trading by a
director does not automatically breach any duties owed to the shareholders [3].
In Percival, a shareholder sold his shares to the chairman and two other
directors. At the time of sale, the directors were negotiating the sale of the
company at a price which represented more per share than the price they paid
to the shareholder [4]. The directors had not informed the shareholder of the
negotiations; the shareholder then sought to have the sale set aside based upon
the non-disclosure [5]. The action failed because it was held that the directors
owed no fiduciary duty to the individual shareholders [6].
2.2. Statutory Scheme in the U.K.
Insider trading was prohibited by Part V of the 1980 Companies Act (1980
Act) [7]. The current law on insider trading has been consolidated in the
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (1985 Act) [8]. The 1985 Act
provides that:
lAin individual who is, or at any time in the preceding six months has been,
knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a recognized stock exchange
in securities of that company if he has information which:
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those
securities [9].
The concept of unpublished price-sensitive information is information which:
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or indirectly) to that
company, that is to say, is not of a general nature relating or of concern to that
company; and
(b) is not generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would be likely
to deal in those securities but which would if it were generally known to them be
likely materially to affect the price of those securities [10].
The 1985 Act makes it an offense for individuals to deal with the securities
of a company with whom they are associated, or any other company on a
recognized stock exchange [11] if those individuals are connected with a
company, or were so connected within the preceding six months [12], are
contemplating or were contemplating making a takeover for such company
[13], or were direct or indirect tippees. Defenses to insider trading include
acting without a profit motive [14], acting in good faith as a trustee in
bankruptcy [15], and "jobbers" acting in good faith [16]. The Act also
prohibits the use of information obtained in an official capacity [17]. These
prohibitions extend to off-market dealings [18]. The 1985 Act, however, does
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not provide any civil remedy for victims of insider trading, and breach of the
1985 Act does not of itself render a transaction void [19]. The common law
position on the validity of a contract where a breach of a fiduciary duty has
occurred is not clear [20].
2.3. Canada
Six of the Canadian Provinces have Securities Acts which were largely
uniform [211, since they were based on the 1966 Ontario Securities Act [221.
The acts require an insider to disclose beneficial shareholdings and any
changes thereon by making a report to the relevant Securities Commission.
which then publishes such changes [231. In addition, there are civil and
criminal penalties for insider trading [24]. The Canada Business Corporations
Act 1975 [25] outlawed insider trading with regard to federal corporations [26].
In Ontario, several changes to the law of insider trading were made by the
Securities Act of 1978 (1978 Act) [27]. The 1978 Act provides that:
Every person or company ... who sells the securities of a reporting issuer with
knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer
that has not been generally disclosed ... is liable to compensate the purchaser of the
securities for damages as a result of the trade.[281.
The Quebec 1982 Securities Act [29] "is probably the most innovative" [30]
of the Canadian Acts dealing with securities law. To some extent, the Act
brings Quebec law into harmony with the legislation of other provinces.
However, the recently created Securities Commission - Commission des valeurs
mobilibres du Qubbec - has new and extensive powers. Also new to Quebec is
the provision of civil remedies for defrauded investors, including insider
trading victims [31]. Two defenses to the use of privileged information are
allowed: the insider believed the "information was generally known or known
to the other party; [or] he availed himself of a plan for the acquisition of
securities established before he learned the information" [32]. The Act pro-
vides that "insiders" [33] must file reports of any change in securities held [34].
Civil liability [35] extends to tippees [36]. The term "privileged information" is
defined as "any information concerning a material fact not yet known to the
public that could affect the value or the market price of securities of any
issuer" [371.
2.4. Australia
Significant differences in the companies legislation of Australia's various
States prompted moves in the 1950's toward a uniform law [38]. The Compa-
nies Act 1961 [39] was based on a uniform bill. The uniform act was partially
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aimed at the control of insider trading:
An officer of a corporation shall not make improper use of information acquired by
virtue of his position as such an officer to gain directly or indirectly an advantage
for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the corporation [40].
In 1975, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and Western Australia
introduced uniform Securities Industry Acts [41]. Insider trading was made an
offense [42]. Civil liability was allowed in order to compensate the victims of
insider trading [43]. These provisions now appear in the Securities Industry
Code operative throughout all Australian jurisdictions except the Northern
Territory [44].
A person who is, or at any time in the preceding six months has been, connected
with a body corporate shall not deal in any securities of that body corporate if by
reason of his so being, or having been connected with that body corporate he is in
possession of infonnation that is not'generally available but, if it were, would be
likely materially to affect the price of those securities [45].
A similar liability is extended to situations where the insider deals with the
securities of "any body corporate" while in possession of inside information
acquired because of the insider's connection with his or her own company and
which "relates to any transaction (actual or expected) involving both those
bodies corporate or involving one of them and the securities of the other" [46].
Liability is also extended to tippees [47].
2.5. The U.S.
The effective regulation of insider trading in the U.S. began with the
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) [48]. The 1934 Act
requires directors, officers, and principal shareholders of companies whose
securities are traded on an organized exchange to report their transactions,
which are then published by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
[491. Profits made within six months are automatically disgorged back to the
company [50]. The key provision is Section 10b of the 1934 Act which provides
that "it shall be unlawful for any person ... to use or employ in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary" [51].
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful when trading in securities:
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security. [52]
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The broad terms of this rule have been interpreted by the courts as
outlawing the practice of insider trading [53]. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.
[54] held that a seller of shares had a private right of action under Rule 10b-5
without having to show that the defendants profited by their actions [55].
Speed o. Transamerica Corporation [56] applied the rule to a majority stock-
holder's offer to minority stockholder, and In re Cady, Roberts & Co. [57], held
the rule applicable to stock exchange dealings. In those dealings, a trader of
shares has an affirmative duty to disclose material information to the other
party if not doing so would give the outsider a false idea of the relevant
circumstances of the transaction [58]. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
[59], where there was a failure to disclose, it was held that positive proof of
reliance by the outsider need not be shown; all that was necessary was that a
reasonable investor considered the undisclosed facts to be important [60].
3. Definitions of Inside Information
The focus of all statutory definitions of insider information is on the type of
information which the insider possesses when dealing with the outsider. All of
these definitions include some combination of the following elements: specific-
ity, confidentiality, unavailability or being generally unknown, and materiality
[61].
3.1. What Constitutes Information?
In an Australian case, Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v. Green [62], a
prosecution was launched under Section 124(2) of the uniform Companies Act
[63]. Green was a director of two companies, Endeavor Oil and Gwello [64]. It
was alleged that at an Endeavor company meeting, Green acquired knowledge
that Endeavor was to make a call on its shares [65]. Green, with this
knowledge, caused Gwello, a company of which he was a major shareholder,
to sell over half of its Endeavor shares [66]. Consequently, when the prices fell
after the announcement of Endeavor's call, Gwello had avoided a loss [67].
The court discussed what kind of information was required to find illegal
insider trading:
In many cases a hint may suggest information or may enable an inference to be
drawn as to information. Information about impending stock movements or share
movements may often be veiled. Discussion concerning such a movement may often
take the form of 'mooting' but not deciding a matter [681.
Knowledge of how those present are likely to vote, assuming the matter was
not discussed, together with knowledge of how the absent member is likely to
vote, may well be inside information. Outside information may supplement
the inside information to make it more meaningful [69].
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In the United States case, SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc. [70], the directors of
Geon were negotiating a possible merger with Burmah. In February, 1974 it
became apparent that the conditions of the merger would not be met and
Burmah ended negotiations in July, 1974 [71]. Neuwirth, who was chairman
and controlled 28 percent of Geon's stock, allegedly tipped two shareholders
in mid-October, 1973 as to the state of negotiations [72]. The court stated that
the transaction was sufficiently uncertain that the company need not include it
in its disclosure report to the SEC [73]. Despite the uncertainty of the merger,
the court held that knowledge of the merger plans was material inside
information [74]. Thus, the information was not the deal itself, but the
probability of the deal [75].
In Green v. Charterhouse Group Canada Ltd. [76], a Canadian case, directors
of Imbrex purchased shares from a stockholder in accordance with a right of
first refusal agreement. At the time of the purchase, unknown to the share-
holder, Imbrex was involved in takeover negotiations [77].
The court described the negotiations as "too inconclusive for either com-
pany to have made any announcement of their intentions in regard thereto"
[78]. Thus, the mere existence of takeover negotiations did not constitute
inside information. However, on appeal, the court concluded that the negotia-
tions had reached the stage where they could be classed as inside information
[79].
While negotiations which may affect the price of relevant shares are
ongoing, questions of degree are involved in deciding whether negotiations
amount to inside information. Geon and Green emphasize that minds may
differ on the same facts. The Canadian courts have been careful to distinguish
the insider's superior knowledge of company affairs or financial affairs gener-
ally from an actual piece of information which is used by the insider [80].
This view is similar to the approach that has been followed in the U.S. In
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur [811, the court stated that the insider is not
"obligated to confer upon the outside investors the benefit of his superior
financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated guesses or
predictions" [82]. These analyses should be distinguished from the "basic
facts" upon which the predictions may be based, facts which the "reasonable
investor" [83] might consider relevant and, therefore, must be disclosed.
3.2. Specific Information
The requirement that information be specific no longer exists in Australia
[84]. It is still part of the law of Canada, except those provinces following the
Ontario model, and the U.K [85].
In Green v. Charterhouse Group, a prosecution under Section 113 of the
Ontario Securities Act failed for inability to show that the insiders had made
use of "specific confidential information" [86]. At first instance, the court
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adopted a strict interpretation of "specific" [87]. The court concluded that the
takeover discussions could not amount to specific information because "the
facts alleged ... were preliminary and uncertain" [88]. The Court of Appeal
disagreed because the bidder had indicated a specific price it was prepared to
offer to Imbrex; this was considered sufficiently specific [89].
3.3. Confidential Information
Some Canadian jurisdictions still require inside information to be "con-
fidential" [90]. The term is relatively imprecise. Normally inside information
will be confidential in the sense that it is given in confidence, such as a
takeover proposal [91], or classified as not being intended for public disclosure
at a particular time, such as projected profits and losses [92]. "Confidential"
has been replaced in other jurisdictions by the phrase "not generally known"
[93].
One commentator has suggested that "confidential" might require the
company to do something to designate a piece of information as confidential
[94]. Yet, it is precisely those persons who must make such a designation who
are most likely to misuse the information. This approach suggests that
information by its intrinsic nature cannot be clearly intended to be confiden-
tial. There are many questions that will have to be determined by litigation.
Does confidential mean the manner in which the information is acquired, or
the manner in which it is dealt with by the company? If it is the former, the
situations in which information would be confidential would be limited. It
would seem to be narrower than the idea of information acquired for the
business of a company. Information can be confidential even if it has not been
acquired for corporate purposes [95].
Once information is "public," it is no longer "confidential" [96]. In Kinwat
Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Platform Pty. Ltd. [97], an Australian case, Platform and
Watkins were both limited companies with four common directors. Platform
made a takeover offer for Watkins [98]. Watkins sought to enjoin the takeover
on the basis that at the time four of Platform's directors possessed inside
information regarding certain assets of Watkins which were substantially
undervalued on its books of accounts [99].
At the time of hearing, this information was contained in an affidavit in
support of the injunction, revealed in a letter to the Stock Exchange and
published in the city newspaper [100]. This was sufficient to make the
information "generally available," and the court considered the possibility
that a news story on its own may constitute sufficient availability [101]. Thus.
market reports, projected sales, or analyses of the effect of changes in
government policies, although all based upon publicly available information,
may still be confidential information depending upon the particular cir-
cumstances of a case.
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3.4. Information Not Generally Available or Generally Known
The definitions of information which is not generally available or known
vary among these jurisdictions. In Australia, information must be "not gener-
ally available" [102]. In the U.K. and Canada, except where the Ontario or
Quebec model is followed, the information must be "not generally known"
[103]. The current Ontario Securities Act requires the information to be "not
generally disclosed" [104]. In Quebec, the Act refers to information that is
"not yet known" [105] to the outsider. In the U.S., judges have spoken of
information being unknown or unavailable [106].
In Ackroyds (London) v. Islington, Plastics [107], the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant breached its contract because the defendant had used confiden-
tial informationfor its own profit, instead of for the plaintiff's benefit [108].
The defendant argxed that knowledge of the process was no longer confiden-
tial [109]. The court disagreed:
[Tihe mere publication of an article by manufacturing it and placing it upon the
market ... is not necessarily sufficient to make such information available to the
public. The question in each case is: Is such information available to the public? It
is not, in my view, if work would have to be done upon it to make it available 1110].
According to the court, if the public cannot understand the information in the
form that it is presented to them - here in a manufactured article - then it is
not generally available. While this rule is imported from the law of confi-
dences and refers to the general public, as opposed to the investing public, it
has an exact parallel in the U.S. regulation on insider trading. In SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur [111], the court said that "where the news is of a sort which is
not readily translatable into investment action, insiders may not take ad-
vantage of their advance opportunity to evaluate the information by acting on
it immediately upon dissemination" [112].
Using this definition, insiders must disclose information and wait until it
has been both disseminated to and digested by the public. The insider must
wait a reasonable period during which the investing public can evaluate the
information. For example, in Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur [113] the court
held that, under the circumstances, twenty days was a reasonable period.
Under the concept of "similar emphasis," the insider must not stress certain
facts while disregarding others [114]. Even where all facts have been disclosed,
the more important facts must be highlighted under the "buried facts doctrine"
[115]. In addition, information should be disclosed in a manner that is
intelligible to the unsophisticated investor [116]. Where previous statements
made by the insider become inaccurate or misleading in the light of new
information to which the insider has access, this must be disclosed to the
outsider [117]. The insider must wait until the information has appeared in a
medium likely to achieve the widest distribution [118]. Thus, there is a
continuing duty on the part of the insider to disclose; however, this obligation
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is not taken to an unreasonable extreme. Courts have held that there is no
violation of the duty to disclose when the information is available to a
reasonably diligent searcher [119].
The rules of the American Stock Exchange which define and describe inside
information [120] attempt to clarify the circumstances when an insider in
possession of inside information may trade. These regulations discourage
insider trading until "the public has had an opportunity to evaluate [the
material information] thoroughly" [121].
The idea of information being "generally available" has an inherent vague-
ness. Courts have attempted to remedy this vagueness by requiring that, in the
absence of clear language, mere public announcement of the information does
not necessarily amount to public availability; there must be digestion of this
information by the investing public [122].
3.5. Material Information
The term "material" is evaluated differently in the Commonwealth coun-
tries than by the U.S. In the U.S. the standard for materiality is that an
outsider's decision would have been different if the outsider had possessed the
inside information, regardless of its affect upon price [123]. Materially, as used
in the Commonwealth definitions, means that the information must affect
price in a discernible manner.
3.5.1. Commonwealth: Information which Affects Price
In Australia and the U.K., information must be likely to affect the price
and must materially affect the price of the securities in which the insider deals
[1241. Likely indicates a degree of probability, something more than a possibil-
ity [125]. One writer sees this as placing an "[e]mphasis on reasonable and
objective contemplation of possible effects on security prices, rather than ...
concentration on what might happen if there were public disclosure of the
information" [126].
One problem in trying to establish that information is likely to affect the
price is determining upon whom the information acts. If the reasonable
investor is used as a guide, the factors such a person would consider relevant
must be considered, including the fact which not all investors in a market are
reasonable preople. Information that might cause one investor to buy shares
might be meaningless to a more sophisticated investor. The results of one drill
core would not, in a rational world, affect the value of a security. However,
experience tells us otherwise [127].
The Ontario Securities Act defines a material fact as a fact that significantly
affects or which "would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on
the market price or value of such securities" [128]. The definition of informa-
tion which "would reasonably be expected to" affect the price [129] is similar
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to the use of the word "likely" in the Australian and British definitions.
The Ontario Court of Appeals has adopted a test which focuses on the
effect of the information on the reasonable shareholder rather than on the
price of stock itself (the "substantial likelihood" test). In Sparling v. Royal
Trustco Ltd. [130], a takeover bid was sent to all directors of Royal Trustco.
The directors were required [131] to send a circular to all Canadian share-
holders [132]. A declaration was sought alleging that the circular did not
contain all other material facts known to the directors or officers of the target
corporation [133].
In deciding whether a valid cause of action existed, the court adopted the
test from the U.S. case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northwvay Inc. [1341, that "an
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote ... " [135].
The use of the terms "value" or "price" in a definition may also affect a
court's determination of whether the information affects the price. In the
Canadian provinces, the statutory definitions refer to information "that, if
generally known, might reasonably be expected to affect materially the value
of such securities" [136]. The intrinsic value of something may not be fully
reflected in its price. One could argue that the value of something could
increase without its price changing materially. On the other hand, value can be
viewed merely as a synonym for price.
3.5.2. The U.S.: Effect of the Information on the Investor
Most discussion of inside information in the U.S. has centered around the
concept of materiality [137]. Only material information must be disclosed
[138]. The concept of materiality focuses on the mind of the outsider and not
the price of the security per se [139]. Price sensitive information, however, can
be material information [140]. The test to determine whether information is
material "is whether a reasonable man would attach importance (to a matter)
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question" [141]. The
reasonable person has also been called the "average prudent investor" [142]
and the "reasonable investor" [143]. It has been said that such phrases "are
interchangeable and intended to have the same meaning" [144], yet the idea of
a "prudent" or "reasonable" investor suggests a degree of conservatism, while
a "reasonable, if speculative" investor implies a more prominent element of
risk [145].
The subjective aspect of the test also poses several questions. For example,
how much market knowledge should a reasonable person have? How much
should a reasonable person know about company history and policy? These
are essentially issues of fact.
In Freedman v. Bbirrow [146], shareholders were sent proxy materials
seeking approval for an executive compensation program. It was claimed that
the accounting treatment of a stock option plan with appreciation rights failed
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to disclose how it differed from that of a straight stock option plan [147]. The
court applied the Northvay test, decided that the omission was not material,
and concluded that an explanation would have been too detailed and intricate
for shareholders [148].
What effect must the information have on an investor before it is consid-
ered material? Is it sufficient that an investor "might" consider it relevant, or
is it necessary that an investor "would" consider it so? The "might" test
would require a lower degree of probability of effect on the investor's
decisional process [149]. The "would" test requires a higher degree of prob-
ability [150]. This debate has been resolved in favor of the latter approach
[1511.
These concepts are difficult to comprehend in terms other than those of
degree. Examples of information that have been considered material include:
greatly improved earnings and an intention to liquidate [152]; failure to
disclose changes in accounting methods which inflated earnings [153]; and
negotiations for the sale of a corporation's major product [154].
4. Conclusion
Two separate theories for the regulation of insider trading have been
recognized - fiduciary duty [155] and unequal bargaining power [156]. Under
the first theory, the insider acquires information belonging to the company. It
would be a breach of the relationship between the insider and the company to
allow the insider to profit from the use of this information. This theory is
similar to the doctrine of corporate opportunity [157], which treats the
information as belonging to the company and focuses on the relationship
between the insider and the company. This is not a true proprietary concept
[158] but, rather, a trust or fiduciary concept, which the word confidential
suggests. Under the second theory, the emphasis is on the fact that the insider
knows something the outsider does not [159].
To some extent there is a tension between these two views. The present
U.K. and Australian formulations emphasize the fiduciary approach by requir-
ing information to be held "by virtue of being connected with the company"
[160] or "by reason of the insider" [161] being so connected. The present
statutory formulations in Canada [162] appear to adopt the unequal bargain-
ing power theory since they do not spell out how the information is to be
acquired.
In the U.S., inside information may be defined as material non-public
information available only for a corporate purpose [163]. Non-public has its
counterpart in Commonwealth regulation in the phrases "not generally dis-
closed" [164] or "not generally known" [165]. However, U.S. regulations and
proposals go further and prescribe certain methods by which an insider can
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make information public. One permissible procedure is the careful and concise
disclosure by means of a press release or public announcement. Alternatively,
one can file with the SEC and then wait for the information to be digested by
the public [166]. In the Commonwealth jurisdictions, the question of whether
information is sufficiently available, known or disclosed to prevent it being
considered inside information is determined on a case-by-case basis. U.S. case
law, however, can illuminate areas not yet considered in the Commonwealth
jurisdictions [167].
Information must be material in the sense that it must "affect a reasonable
investor's judgment" [168]. This has no direct counterpart in the Com-
monwealth, except for Quebec, which has adopted the Northway test as a
standard of materiality [169]. In most other situations, this separate materiality
concept would not appear to matter since "price-affective" information must
be "mind-affective" [170]. The reverse is not necessarily true. Requiring such
an element in the Commonwealth would complicate matters by requiring that
two standards, "price-affective" and "mind-affective", be satisfied in each
case.
In the U.S., information must relate to the company or its business [171]. In
the U.K., this has an express counterpart in requiring the information to be of
direct or indirect concern [172] to the company. Otherwise, it is subsumed
under the rubric of confidential information [173] or "material fact or change
with respect to" [174] the company in Canada. In Australia, part of this is
covered by the requirement that information must be acquired by reason of
the insider's being "connected with" [175] the corporate body. In the U.S.,
information need not be acquired by reason of the insider's association with
the company. To some extent, however, a similar effect may be achieved by
the requirement that it be intended for corporate purposes only [176].
Requiring express disclosure of inside information before the insider can
trade will bring more clarity to the definition of inside information. The
adoption of the public disclosure requirement in the Commonwealth countries
would clarify the existing definitions and provide a clear test. Thus, if the
insider has not met disclosure requirements, then the insider cannot trade
without breaching the relevant statutory prohibition.
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carrying on the business of a jobber." Id.
[17] Id. at § 2.
[18] Id. at §§ 4-5.
[19] Id. at § 8.
[20] See, e.g., In re Wimbledon Olympia Ltd. [1910] 1 Ch. 630 (recision of a contract is not
available merely for a breach of disclosure requirements of the Companies (Consolidation) Act.
1908 8 Edw. 7, ch. 69); Edler v. Auerback, [1950] 1 K.B. 359, (the contract remains intact absent
fraudulent misrepresentation). But see Nat'l Companies & Securities Comm'n v. Monarch
Petroleum N.L., 1984 Vict. R. 733 (Australia) (court rescinded all contracts for sale of shares in
Monarch made as a result of a forged letter stating that Monarch had acquired an interest in a
valuable oil discovery).
[21]. The six provinces are Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and
Quebec. See Securities Act, Alta. Stat. ch. S-61 (1981); Securities Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 380
(1978); Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466 (1980); Securities Act, Man. Stat. ch. 50 (1980):
Securities Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. ch. S-42 (1978); Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48 (1982).
[22] Securities Act, ch. 142, 1966 Ont. Stat:
[23] Securities Act, Alta Stat. ch. S-6.1. §§ 146-160 (1980); Securities Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. ch.
380, §§ 108-109 (1978); Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, §§ 101-105 (1980); Securities Act,
Man. Stat. ch. 50, §§ 101-105 (1980); Securities Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. ch. S-42. §§ 116-119 (1978):
Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 96-99 (1982).
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[24] Securities Act, Alta. Stat. ch. S-6.1, §§ 114-115 (1981); Securities Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. cl.
380, §§ 112-113 (1978); Securities Act. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466. §§ 131-132 (1980); Securities Act,
Man. Stat. ch. 50, § 118 (1980); Securities Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. ch. S-42, §§ 121-122 (1978);
Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 226-229 (1982).
[25] Canada Business Corporations Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 33 (1975).
[26] Id. at § 125(5).
[27] Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466 (1980).
[28] Id. at § 131(1). The Act allows the following defenses to changes of insider trading:
(a) the person or company ... had reasonable grounds to believe that the material
fact or material change had been generally disclosed; [or]
(b) the material fact or material change was known or ought reasonably to have
been known to the purchaser; [or]
(c) the person or company in the special relationship with the reporting issuer
proves that he or it did not make use of knowledge of the material fact or
material change in selling the securities or in communicating knowledge of the
material fact or material change. as the case may be.
[29] Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48 (1982).
[301 La Rochelle & Simmonds, Bill 85, Quebec's New Securities Act, 29 McGill UJ. 89, 91
(1983). The authors also state:
Its drafting owes most to the 'Ontario Act [of 1978], but it has also been much
influenced by the federal Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada. more
than any other provincial Act to date. It also appears to have been influenced by
present and proposed securities law in the United States (footnote excluded).
[311 Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48. §§ 187-194. 226-233 (1982).
[321 Id. at § 187.
[33] Id. at § 89. Section 89 provides that:
The insiders of a reporting issuer that are subject to the disclosure requirements
established in this chapter are:
(1) the issuer itself, its subsidiaries, its senior executives and the senior executives
of its subsidiaries;
(2) any person who exercises control over more than 10% of voting rights
attached to the outstanding securities of a reporting issuer, other than
securities that were the object of a firm underwriting and are in the course of
distribution;
(3) the senior executives of a person contemplated in paragraph 2.
[34] Id. at §§ 89-103.
[35] Id. at §§ 187-194, 226-233.
[36] Id. at §§ 187-188.
[37] Id. at § 5.
[38] See generally, H. Mason & J. O'Hair, Australian Company Law xiii-xiv (3d ed. 1980).
[39] Companies Act. No. 71, 1961 N.S.W. Stat.; Companies Act, No. 55, 1961 Queensl. Stat.;
Companies Act, No. 56, 1962 S. Austl. Sess. Stat.; Companies Act, No. 66. 1961 Tasm. Sess. Stat.;
Companies Act, No. 6839, 1961 Vict. Acts; An act to amend the Companies Act, 1943-60, No. 10,
1961 W. Austl. Stat.
[40] See, e.g., Companies Act, No. 71, § 124, 1961 N.SAV. Stat.
[41] Securities Industry Act, No. 3, 1976 N.S.W. Stat.; Securities Industry Act, No. 78. 1975
Queensl. Stat.; Securities Industry Act, No. 8788, 1975 Vict. Acts; Securities Industry Act, No. 99,
1975 IV. Austl. Stat. South Australia enacted similar legislation in 1979. See Securities Industry
Act, No. 6. 1979 S. Austl. Sess. Stat.
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[421 See. e.g.. Securities Industry Act. 1975, No. 3 § 113, 1976 N.S.W. Stat.
[43] See, e.g., id. at § 114(c).
[44] In 1978. the six states and the Commonwealth signed a formal agreement. a copy of
which is the Schedule to the National Companies and Securities Commission Act 1979. Austl.
Acts P.. No. 173 reprinted in R. Baxt. H.A.J. Ford. G.J. Samuel. C.M. Maxwell. An Introduction
to the Securities Industry Codes at Appendix I (2d ed. 1982). to establish a cooperative and
uniform companies and securities legislative scheme. The Commonwealth passed the Securities
Industry Act 1980. Austl. Acts P.. No. 66, to apply in the Australian Capital Territory. Each State
then passed a Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act. See Securities Industry (Application
of Laws) Act. No. 61. 1981 N.S.W. Stat.: Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act. No. 48.
1981 Queensl. Stat.; Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act. No. 17. 1981 S. Austl. Sess.
Stat.; Securities Industry (Tasmania) Code. No. 179. 1981 Tasm. Sess. Stat.: Securities Industry
(Victoria) Code. No. 2089. 1981 Vict. Acts: Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act. No. 31.
1981 W. Austl. Stat.
[45] See Securities Industry Act 1980, Austl. Acts P.. No. 66. § 128(1).
[46] Id. at § 128(2).
[47] Id. at § 128(3). Section 128(3) provides that a person, not otherwise prohibited, shall not
deal in securities if:
(a) he has obtained the information, directly or indirectly, from another person and
is aware, or ought reasonably to be aware, of facts of circumstances by virtue of
which that other person is then himself precluded by subsection (1) or (2) from
dealing in those securities; and
(b) when the information was so obtained, he was associated with that other person
or had with him an arrangement for the communication of information of a
kind to which those subsections apply with a view to dealing in securities by
himself and that other person or either of them.
[48] 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1982) the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1982).
was the first significant piece of federal securities legislation. With the passage of the 1934 Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission was responsible for the administration of both acts. See
general.r Seligman. The Reformnaton of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information.
73 Geo. LJ. 1083 (1985); Comment, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recoverr
of the Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 483 (1985).
[49] 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
[50] 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) (commonly known as § 16(b)).
[511 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982).
[521 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
[531 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally.
Comment. supra note 48. at 483-93: Note. The Supreme Court's Highwire Act: Balancing SEC
Enforcement and Market Efficiency in Dirks u. SEC, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 923. 925-27 (1984).
[541 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
[55] Id. at 514.
[56] 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.C. Del. 1951). supp. opinion, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D.C. Del. 1951).
[57] 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
[58] Id. at 912.
[59] 406 U.S. 128, reh'g denied, 407 U.S. 916 (1972).
[60] Id. at 153-54.
[611 In the U.S.. the insider must disclose non-public material information regarding the
company's business. Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974). In addition, insider trading laws usually require the insider to be associated with the
corporation in some way. In Australia. information must be acquired "by reason of the insider
being connected with" the company. Securities Industry Act 1980. Austl. Acts P.. No. 66. § 128(1).
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The British Companies Act refers to information the insider "holds by virtue of being connected
with the company." Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, cl. 8, § 1(1)(a) (U.K.).
[62] 1978 Vict. R. 505.
[63] Companies Act, No. 6839, 1961 Vict. Acts.




[68] Id. at 511
[69] Id.
[70] 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
[71] Id. at 45.
[72] Id. at 42-46.
[73] Id. at 48.
[74] Id. at 47.
[75] Id. at 47; see also T.S.C. Indus. v. Northway Inc.. 426 U.S. 438, 445-50 (1976) (under
U.S. law, information must be material in that it must affect the hearer's mind); Compare
Northwa) with Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 333-39 (1979) (the obligations of the mandatory
requirements are obviously different from the antifraud obligation, and require greater certainty).
[76] 35 D.L.R.3d 161 (1973), affd., 68 D.L.R.3d 592 (1976).
177] 68 D.L.R.3d at 610.
[78] 35 D.L.R.3d at 226.
[79] 68 D.L.R.3d at 618.
[801 See, e.g., Charterhouse, 35 D.L.R.3d at 224 (quoting Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed.
1961)). The Court stated:
- one must differentiate between a knowledge or expertise developed through
experience or financial sophistication about the company or the market of its shares
from facts or information which are available to all parties involved and a
knowledge of specific events or the probability of future events gained through the
directors' access to the corporate business or activities which are not available to the
other parties with whom the director is dealing or to the public generally. The latter
case is inside information. The former only points out the special ability of the
director which he is entitled to use to his own benefit and need not pass on the
advantage thereof.
[81] 401 F.2d at 833.
[82] Id. at 848.
[83] Id. at 849.
[841 See supra note 41.
[85] See Securities Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. ch. S-6.1, §§ 180-182 (1981); Securities Act, B.C. Rev.
Stat. ch. 380, § 112 (1979); Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, §§ 131-132 (1980); Securities
Act, Man. Rev. Stat. ch. S50, §§ 113, 114 (1970); Securities Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. ch. S-42, §§
121-122 (1978); Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 187-190, 228, 229 (1982); Companies
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 ch. 8, § 10(a) (U.K.).
[86] 35 D.LR.3d at 228.
[87] Id. at 224-27.
[88] Id. at 228.
[89] 68 D.L.R.3d at 618.
[90] See Charlerhouse Group, 35 D.L.R.3d at 161, 68 D.L.R.3d at 592; see also A.B. Afterman,
Company Directors and Controllers 117 (1970).
[91] See, eg., Charterhouse Group, 68 D.L.R.3d at 592.
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[92] See Geon Industries, 531 F.2d at 44.
[93] See Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48. § 187 (1982).
(94] Afterman, supra note 90, at 117.
[95] Charterhouse Group, 68 D.L.R.3d at 621.
[96] 35 D.L.R.3d at 228 ("When the information lost its confidentiality by publication, it
mattered not then whether the plaintiff knew of it or not because at that point, it ceased to be the
subject of § 113.").
[97] 1982 Queensl. R. 370.
1981 Id. at 370-71.
[991 Id. at 371.
[100] Id. at 372.
[101] Id. at 376; see also Johnson v. Wiggs. 443 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1971) (easily
understood information is in the public domain because it "was previously reported to be in the
area newspapers and on a local television station which gave financial news").
[102] Securities Industry Act 1980 Austl. Acts. P., No. 66, § 128(1).
[103] See Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 ch. 8 § 10(b) (U.K.); Securities Act.
Alta. Rev. Stat. ch. S-6.1, § 115(1) (1981); Securities Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 380, §§ 112-113
(1979); Securities Act, Man. Rev. Stat. ch. S.50, § 113(1) (1970).
[104] Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, § 131 (1980).
11051 Securities Act, Que. Stat. ch. 48, § 5 (1982).
[106] Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. The A.L.I. Draft Securities Code makes it unlawful
to engage in insider trading if the insider knows a fact of special significance "that is not generally
available." Federal Securities Code § 1603(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as
A.LI. Draft Securities Code].
[107] 1962 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 97.
[1091 Id. at 98.
[109] Id. at 99.
[11 0] Id. at 104.
[111] 401 F.2d at 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
1112] Id. at 854.
[113] 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), cert. dented, 405 U.S. 918 (1971).
[114] Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F. 2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1968), reo'd on other grounds,
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
[115] See Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D.C. Del. 1971); see
also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970). modified. 458 F.2d
255 (3d Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
[116] See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
[117] See Hutto v. Texas Income Properties Corp.. 416 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
(118] See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
[119] U.S. courts have interpreted the concept of materiality in the same manner under various
federal securities laws: See Mills, 396 U.S. at 375 (Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429
F. 2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) (Section 12(2) and Rule 10b-5).
[120] 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) j 10,122 (1984).
[121] Id. at § 402(0.
[122] See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
[123] See Northway. 426 U.S. at 445-50.
[124] See Securities Industry Act 1980, Austl. Acts P. No. 66, § 128(1); Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 ch. 8, § 10(b) (U.K.).
[125] Webster's Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary 1048 (1979) ("probable" is one meaning of
"likely").
[126] Bailey, Insiders, Insider Information and the Securities Industry Act 1975 5 Austl. Bus.
L.R. 269, 276 (1977).
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1127] See Reynolds, 401 F.2d at 553.
[128] Securities Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, § 131 (1980).
[129] Id.
11301 6 D.L.R.4th 682 (1984).
[131] Canada Business Corporations Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 194 (1975).
[132] 6 D.L.R.4th at 684.
[1331 Id.
[134] 426 U.S. at 438.
(135] Id. at 448-49.
[1361 Securities Act, Alta. Stat. ch. S-6.1, § 1 (1981); Securities Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 380, §§
112-113 (1978); Securities Act, Man. Rev. Stat. ch. 550, §§ 113-114 (1980); Securities Act. Ont.
Rev. Stat. ch. 466, § 131 (1980); Securities Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. ch. S-42, §§ 121-122 (1978);
Securities Act, Que. Star. ch. 48, § 5 (1982).
[137] See, e.g., Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. Law. 887
(1977).
[138] See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-50; see also List v. Fashion Park. Inc.. 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
[139] However, at a minimum, the information must concern the company or its securities.
This idea is expressed in the oftenused phrase that there must be "market information." Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). It must also affect the value of the securities traded.
Affiliated Ule Citizens, 406 U.S. at 128.
[140] Northivay, 426 U.S. at 445-50.
[141] Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457 at 462; see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §
538(2)(a) (1977).
[142] In re Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934).
[143] Northwvay, 426 U.S. at 449.
[144] Hewitt, supra note 137. at 894.
[145] "Reasonable" is defined as: "having sound judgment, sensible, moderate, not expecting
too much," 8 The Oxford English Dictionary 215 (1961), while "speculate" means to "make
investment, engage in commercial operation, that involves risk of loss." 10 id. at 558. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the court rejected the standard of "prudent or conservative investors" as too narrow.
401 F.2d at 849.
[146] 427 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
[1471 Id. at 1139.
[148] Id. at 1140.
[149] See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo. Inc., 478 F,2d 1281. 1302 (2d Cir. 1973).
(150] Id.
[151] Northway, 426 U.S. at 445-50.
[152] See In re Ward La France Truck Corporation, 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
[153] See Value Line Fund v. Marcus, 1965 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 91,523.
[154] See Rogen Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966), reh'g denied, 554 F.2d 1965 (5th
Cir. 1977).
[155] See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Charterhouse Group, 68
D.L.R.3d at 617; Es-me Pty. Ltd. v. Parker, 1972 W. Austl. R. 52, 55. See generally, Brudney,
supra note 75, at 326 (the obligation to disclose inside information "undoubtedly has [its] roots in
fiduciary considerations" while the "'market context in which transactions in securities" occur
"invites" a similar duty); Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate
"Insiders" in the U.S., 33 Mod. L.R. 34 (1970).
(156] See Kimber Report, 2.02, quoted in Charterhouse Group., 35 D.L.R.3d at 218:
The ideal securities market should be a free and open market with the prices thereon
based upon the fullest possible knowledge of all relevant facts among traders. Any
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factor which tends to destroy or put in question this concept lessens the confidence
of the investing public in the market place and is. therefore, a matter of public
concern.
This is referred to as the "informational advantage" in Brudney, supra note 75, at 339. who
argues that "the function of the antifraud rules is to place all exchange transactions on a parity of
information with all others - to deny informational advantages to any person dealing in the
securities market over any other person with whom he deals." See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur Co..
401 F.2d at 851-52.
(157] This doctrine treats the right to exploit a corporate opportunity belonging solely to the
company and not the insiders or other officers. See Canadian Aero Service Ltd. V. O'Malley, 40
D.L.R.3d 371 (1974); Hansen. Corporation Law. 10 Ottawa L.R. 617, 662-70 (1978)- Slaughter.
The Corporate Opportunit , Doctrine, 18 Southwestern L.J. 96 (1964).
[1581 While information may be property. Diamond v. Oreamuno. 24 N.Y.2d 494. 248 N.E.2d
910 (1969): Boardman v. Phipps. f19671 2 A.C. 46. 89-91, 107, 115-17 (H.L.); Abbey Glen
Property Corp. v. Stumborg, 65 D.L.R.3d 235 (1976), aff'd. 85 D.LR.3d 35 (1978). this is not
really the issue here. The issue is the right to exploit the information given the relationship
between the insider and the company.
1159] The information has been described as "not generally known." Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 ch. 8, § 1 (U.K.) or "not generally disclosed," Securities Act. Ont.
Rev. Stat. ch. 466. § 131(1) (1980).
[160] Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 ch. 8. § 10 (U.K.).
[161] Securities Industry Act 1980, Austl. Acts P., No. 66, § 128(1). In Ryan v. Triguboff.
11976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 588. Lee, J., stated that "[i]t is clear that the purpose of the legislature in
introducing § 75A into the Securities Industry Act was to [specifically provide] for cases where ...
directors ... made, or sought to make, a profit from dealing in the company's securities by putting
to use [inside] information." Id. at 595.
1162] See Kimber Report, supra note 156, at 1 2.02: See also Charterhouse Group. 68
D.L.R.3d at 621 ("The probabilities doubtless are that the insider acquired his information
through participation in the company's affairs, but that is not a sine qua non to the operation of
the section.").
1163] See Texas Gulf Sulphur. 401 F.2d at 847-49.
[164] Securities Act. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, § 131 (1980).
1165] Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act. 1985 ch. 8. § 10 (U.K.). For Canadian
Statutes, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
[166] Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854, see also A.LI. Draft Securities Code. supra note
106, at § 265.
[1671 See the discussion of "non-public" information in Fridgitemp Corp. v. Financial
Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1975); Wiggs. 443 F.2d at 806.
[168] Northway, 426 U.S. at 445-50.
[1691 Sparling v. Royal Trustco Ltd.. 6 D.L.RAth 683 (1984).
1170] SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); aff'd 558 F.2d 1083 (2d
Cir. 1977).
[171] Dirks v. SEC. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For an exhaustive summary of the literature on
Dirks. see Seligman, supra note 48, at 1083 n.2.
11721 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985 ch. 8. § 10 (U.K.).
[173] See supra note 90.
[174] Securities Act. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 466, § 131 (1980), Securities Act. Que. Stat. ch. 48. § 5
(1982) (definition refers only to "material fact").
[175] Securities Industry Act 1980, Austl. Acts P., No. 66.
[176] Te.xcas Gulf Sulphur. 401 F.2d at 848.
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